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Artificial Wombs: "The Third Era of Human
Reproduction" and the Likely Impact on
French and U.S. Law
Marion Abecassis*
INTRODUCTION
After the contraceptive pill, artificial insemination, in vitro
fertilization, the next step will be ectogenesis, that is to say the
artificial uterus.
-

Henri Atlan

What if artificial wombs were available tomorrow? The arrival of such
technology may well represent the zenith of the reproductive revolution.]
According to experts it would mark the dawn of the "third era of human
reproduction." 2 No longer would fetus and mother have to "travel
together" during the gestational period.
In 1931, the English writer Aldous Huxley famously depicted artificial
wombs in his novel Brave New World:4 "[T]here, in the crimson darkness,
stewing warm on their cushion of peritoneum and gorged with bloodsurrogate and hormones, the fetuses grew and grew." 5 The fiction was
initially met with criticism and groups in the United States continue to
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Law Center; French Fulbright Grantee 2014-2015. The author is grateful for the
encouragements of Professor Susan Crockin, Doctor Robert Stillman, Professor John
Robertson, and Professor Henri Atlan. The author would like to add a special thank you to
Ryan Cauley and Travis Hairfield who devoted time to proofread this article, and to Ali
Nicolette, Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Hastings Women's Law Journal, for her excellent
corrections and comments.
1. See e.g. R.

LEE & D.

MORGAN,

HUMAN

FERTILIZATION AND

EMBRYOLOGY:

REGULATING THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION (2001).

2. S. Wellin, Reproductive Ectogenesis: The Third Era of Human Reproduction and
Some Moral Consequences, 10(4) SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 615 (2004).

3. Id.
4.
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request its removal from circulation. 6 In 2005, French biologist Henri
Atlan-in his highly publicized book, L'Uterus Artficiel-attempted to
pragmatically analyze the likely consequences of introducing artificial
wombs into the reproductive technology market.7 His book generated
spirited debate among French scholars in the bioethics field.
Scientists and sociologists are growing increasingly concerned by the
science of ectogenesis, a process in which an embryo grows independent of
its mother's body. 9 For some medical professionals, ectogenesis represents
the logical evolution of neonatology, the modem technology that allows
premature babies to survive.'o For others, the creation and use of artificial
wombs are more closely related to the antiquated effort at disconnecting
sexuality from procreation."
Regardless of the lens through which
ectogenesis is analyzed, it has the potential to revolutionize our perspective
on childbirth, medical technology, and the limitations of our current
knowledge.
Ectogenesis is feared because it is difficult to distinguish between
futuristic fantasy and scientific, and social, reality.' 2 This article is based
on the prediction that artificial womb technology will soon be introduced to
the international market and that safety for the ectogenetic child will be
successfully achieved.' 3 Although philosophical and social implications
are necessarily invoked in a discussion of artificial wombs, this article
addresses more fully the legal analysis and ramifications of such a practice.
It must be finally noted that this article focuses primarily on full
6. Huxley's book was the 52nd most challenged book between 1990 and 2000, more than
sixty years after its original publication. American Library Association, The 100 most frequently
challenged books of 1990-2000, http://www.ala.orgrfemplate.cfn?Section=bbwlinks&Template
=/ContentManag ement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=85714 (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
7. HENRI ATLAN, L'UTERUS ARTIFICIEL (Editions du Seuil, 2005).

8. Philippe Descamps notices that Atlan's book provoked a "wave of panic" among
French thinkers in the field of bioethics. He also points out that the Report on family and
children rights led by the French Assembl6e Nationale in 2006 [hereinafter "2006 Report"]
cites Henri Atlan's book and the artificial wombs as possible scientific advances that could
challenge the structure of the family. Philippe Descamps, L'inflation bioethique dans la
perspective de I'ectogendse, 28 RAISONS POLITIQUES 116 (2007); RAPPORT NO. 2832 FAIT AU
NOM DE LA MISSION D'INFORMATION SUR LA FAMILLE ET LES DROITS DES ENFANTS 14 (2006),
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rap-info/i2832.asp.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. Although critics see ectogenesis as an unnecessary next step. Reihan Salam, The End
of Pregnancy: And the inevitable rise of the artificial womb, SLATE.COM (Oct. 23, 2014,
6:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/culturebox/2014/10/ectogenes
is theendof pregnancy.andthe-inevitable_rise_ofthe artificial.htmi ("If ectogensis ...
ever happens in the real world, it will be a more than just a banal next step from the other
technologies that already keep premature babies alive.").
I1. J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS, OR, SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE 17 (1923); ATLAN,

supra note 7, at 9.
12. Terms used by Amel Alghrani in The Legal and Ethical Ramifications of
Ectogenesis, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INTERNATIONAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y 195 (2007).

13. For more on the "reasonable assurance" issue, see Jessica H. Schultz, Development of
Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 877, 894 (2010).
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ectogenesis, as opposed to partial ectogenesis (the possible transfer of
embryos once "natural gestation" has already started).
This article offers a comparative analysis of the prospective legal
impact of the introduction of artificial wombs on the market in France and
in the United States. Part I includes a background of the science of
ectogenesis and a brief comparison of the current French and American
positions vis-iA-vis reproductive technologies. The following parts explore
three main legal dilemmas that both French and U.S. law must resolve to
sanction the use of ectogenesis: the status of the ectogenetic embryo, the
concept of parenthood, and access to ectogenetic technology. This article
offers potential guidelines and suggests specific legal reforms, such as the
creation of a set of clear legal statuses for the embryos, for French and U.S.
legislatures to implement in order to regulate ectogenesis as a reproductive
method.

I. BACKGROUND
A. ECTOGENESIS & ARTIFICIAL WOMBS
The process of conception and gestation was once an opaque and
particularly enigmatic phenomenon veiled by feminine mystery and
divine intervention. Pregnant women in ancient Egypt turned to Isis,
Goddess of Fertility and Motherhood and keeper of powerful magic, to
keep them safe, and the moment of birth was considered an "Act of the
Gods."' 4 The advent of scientific information and medical technology,
however, gradually separated any magical aspect attributed to female
reproduction as the process of pregnancy and childbirth was
increasingly controlled and tamed by Men. The myth of ectogenesis
orchestrated by scientific means came to existence relatively recently
and is heavily attributed to British scientist and professor John B. S.
Haldane in the twentieth century. In 1923, Professor Haldane gave a
conference entitled Daedalus, or Science of the Future, in which he
imagined a student in the year 2070 talking about the landmark
discoveries of the two last centuries.1s Haldane not only evoked the
first ectogenetic child, that is to say the first child whose gestation
would have occurred entirely in a laboratory, but also roughly explained
the scientific progress that would enable the process of ectogenesis to
become a reality.' 6
Ectogenesis involves the implantation and full development of the fetus
outside the human body,' 7 by in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), in an artificial
womb. The artificial womb is the technological device that carries the

14. Geoffrey Chamberlain, Historical perspectives on health, Childbirth in Ancient
Egypt, THE J. OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y FOR THE PROMOTION OF HEALTH 284 (2004).
15. HALDANE, supra note 11.

16. Id.
17. "Able to live and develop outside a host."

Ectogenous, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1982); "The growth process of embryonic tissue placed in an artificial
environment .... " Ectogenesis, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999).
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extracorporeal gestation in lieu of the woman's uterus and mimics the
structure of a natural uterus. The walls of the cavity, according to Henri
Atlan, would be made of endometrial tissue, allowing the implantation of
the fertilized egg.' 8 In the course of the gestation, the ectogenetic device
would allow nutrient and hormone supply, as well as waste filtration.' 9 it
would undertake multiple fundamental functions, which would evolve as
the fetus grows, such as ensuring its protection against viruses and bacteria,
and controlling light and temperature. 20 Full ectogenesis must be
distinguished from the care of very premature babies 2' because the early
stages and the final stages of gestation demand varying conditions.
Ectogenesis must also be distinguished from the gestation of a child outside
his or her biological mother: for the last several decades, in vitro
fertilization has allowed a fetus to grow outside the natural mother's womb,
although it still requires the use of a woman's body for formal gestation.23
Embryologists are able to grow an embryo in vitro for five days post
fertilization. Medical teams in neonatology departments are able to care
for babies born prematurely up to only twenty-two weeks of natural
gestation.24 Medical technology can now successfully maintain fetal life
outside the woman's body between up to five days post fertilization and
after twenty-two weeks natural gestation.2 5 Advancements in ectogenetic
technology have begun to fill in the gap between the fifth day after
fertilization and the twenty-second week of natural gestation.
The most outstanding work in this area is a set of studies performed by
Dr. Helen Liu in 2002 at Cornell University's Centre for Reproductive
Medicine and Infertility. Dr. Liu, an embryology specialist, developed a
growing interest in the mechanism of implantation, or how a fertilized egg
successfully attaches itself to the endometrium in the women's womb.
She sought to develop an external and computerized device composed of
tissues extracted from a woman's uterus, and she studied the interactions
between this potential "artificial womb" and a fertilized egg.27 She
ultimately claimed that she was able to grow a human embryo up to ten
18.

ATLAN,

supra note 7, at 48.

19. ATLAN, supra note 7, at 48.

20. Id.
21. See e.g., Schultz, supra note 13, at 880.
22. This is why Henri Atlan suggests development of two types of artificial wombs:
scientists, such as Liu, focused on the "early" womb ("I'ut6rus artificial pr6coce"), while the
team led by Kuwabara concentrated on the "late" womb ("I'ut6rus artificial tardif") with
fetuses already developed. ATLAN, supra note 12, at 42-48.
23. See e.g,. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 196. Like artificial wombs, surrogacy
allows the intended mother to have a genetic child although she did not carry the fetus
during gestation (but unlike artificial wombs, surrogacy still requires a woman's body
and is not totally "artificial").
24. Neil Marlow, The Elephant in the Delivery Room, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 372,
1856-1857 (2015).
25. Descamps, supra note 8, at 112.
26. L'UTERUs ARTIFICIEL (ARTE 2001), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?vWEaefApW70c.
27. Christine Rosen, Why Not Artificial Wombs?, I NEW ATLANTIS 1, 67 (2003).
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28
days, the maximum allowed by law, in the artificial womb. Dr. Helen Liu
was even more successful with mouse embryos, for which the U.S.
legislation does not restrict the duration of the experiment. Her most
notable achievement was an almost complete term of twenty-one days
gestation of a mouse in an artificial womb. However, as she stated later in
an interview for a French documentary, the mouse embryo growing in her
9
artificial incubator was subject to severe malformation. 2
In Tokyo, Dr. Kuwabara, chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at Juntendo University, tried to build a sustainable artificial
30
womb using goat fetuses for the purposes of his studies. In 1997, he was
able to keep a seventeen-week-old goat fetus in extra uterine incubation for
three weeks.3
It is yet uncertain when artificial wombs will be effective and
available for widespread consumer use. In 1996, Arthur L. Caplan,
director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, told
the New York Times that he predicted the first experimental protocols
being available within thirty years. For him, like for many other
scientists, the creation of artificial wombs was already "technologically
inevitable" as he noticed spectacular advances in neonatology. 3 2 Today,
numerous complex issues remain to be solved in order to make artificial
wombs a reality, such as determining the exact quantity of oxygen,
nutrients and hormones needed by the embryo at the different stages of
gestation. 33 We may not yet have the tools necessary to unlock all the
mysteries behind human gestation, 34 and some scholars are still skeptical of
ectogenetic technology. There is genuine hope in the scientific community,
however, that these technical and biological barriers will be successfully
35
overcome in the next two decades.

B. FRANCE AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

The French approach to the use of reproductive technologies tends to
be guided by prudence. The basis of this approach is to avoid playing the
"sorcerer's apprentice" to the detriment of ethical standards simply to

-

28. Id. at 69.
29. Schultz, supra note 13, at 882.
30. Jeremy Rifkin, The end of pregnancy, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2002, 9:22 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/17/gender.medicalscience.
31. See e.g., Alghrani, supra note 12, at 196. Some videos of Dr. Kuwabara's
experiments can be accessed on line: L'UTERUs ARTIFICIEL, supra note 18, at 0:19. On
another note, the Raelian movement, which believes that life on Earth was created by a
species of extraterrestrials, issued a 2003 press release seeking the help of scientists to
create an artificial womb named "BABYTRON." Rosen, supra note 27, at 70.
32. Perri Klass, The artificial womb is born, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, at SM-1 17,
availableat http://www.nytimes.coml1996/09/29/magazine/the-artificial-womb-is-bom.html.
DIEGO F-I
33. Scott LaFee, Will Artificial Wombs mean the end ofpregnancy?, U-T SAN
4 2 2 99 99
(Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/science/200 0 5mzlc25womb.html.
34. The hormonal mechanisms allowing changes in the composition of the amniotic fluid
during pregnancy are not well known at this time. See e.g., ATLAN, supra note 7, at 45.
35. See e.g., Rifkin, supra note 30; Rosen, supra note 27, at 70; Alghrani, supra note 12,
at 197.
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satisfy the wish to have children. 36 Although the benefits of reproductive
technologies for society have been widely recognized since the birth of the
first French "test tube baby" under the supervision of Dr. Frydman in
1982," the French legislator strictly limits their availability. Indeed, as
stated at the beginning of the chapter dedicated to assisted reproductive
technology in the French Code of Public Health, such technology shall be
used only to remedy medically diagnosed pathological infertility or to
avoid transmitting a very serious disease to the unborn child or the other
member of the couple.38 More generally, the last decade has been marked
by a legislative and regulatory inflation circumscribing-rather than
prohibiting-various bioethical practices.39
The use of assistive reproductive technologies ("ART") in France
illustrates the tension between the conservative, restrictive legislative push
in reproductive technology and the reality of a popular, well-used
technology.
The French social security system covers all the costs
generated by in vitro fertilization (up to four attempts) for female residents
before age forty-three. 4 0 France has historically one of the highest fertility
rates of Europe.4 1 In fact, one out of thirty-five babies born in France in
2012 was conceived with the help of assisted reproductive technologies, 4 2
compared with only one out of every hundred babies in the United States.4 3
France occupies a middle position and "accepts ARTs but strongly
resists more novel reproductive technologies."44 France's attitude toward
surrogacy is much less nuanced than toward in vitro fertilization. Since 1991,
the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) has considered surrogacy an
act against the French fundamental principle of "non-commercialization of the
human body.,45 A provision was later added in the French Civil Code that

36. The 2006 Report is very meaningful on this point: "in the field of reproduction ...
the Legislator avoid playing the sorcerer's apprentice and must maintain ethical safeguards."
RAPPORT NO.2832,supra note 8, at 15.

37. Amandine, the first French "test tube baby" was born in 2013 the aid of Dr. Frydman.
Amandine, premier bibe-dprouvettefrangais, donne naissancea unefille, LE MONDE, (June
16, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/sante/article/2013/06/16/amandine-premier-beb
e-eprouvette-francais-donne-naissance-a-une-fille 34309921651302.html.
38. CODE DE LA SANTt PUBLIQUE [C.S.P] [Code of Public Health], Art. L.2141-2 (Fr.).
39. Descamps, supra note 8, at 111.

40. LE COOT D'UNE FIV, http://www.fiv.fr/cout-fiv/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
41. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, With 2.01 children
per woman, France has one of the highest fertility rates in Europe, http://www.

diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy- 1/economic-diplomacy-foreign-trade/facts-aboutfrance/one-figure-one-fact/article/2-01 -the-average-number-of (last updated Oct. 2013).
42. Agence Frangaise de la Biom6decine, LE RAPPORT MfDICAL ET SCIENTIFIQUE DE
L'ASSISTANCE MtDICALE A LA PROCREATION ET DE LA G NtTIQUE HUMAINES EN FRANCE 9

(2012), available at http://www.agence-biomedecine.fr/annexes/bilan2013/donnees/proc
reation/0 I -amp/synthese.htm.
43. See infra Part I.C.
44. John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology in Germany and the UnitedStates: An Essay
in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43(l) COLUM. J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. 189, 191 (2004).

45. Cour de cassation [Cass.) [supreme court for judicial matters], Ass. pl6n., May 31,
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specifically states, "all agreements relating to procreation or gestation for the
benefit of another are null.'A 6 Interestingly, the European Court of Human
Rights recently condemned the French position for not recognizing the
establishment of a relationship between a father and his biological children
born following surrogacy arrangements abroad.47 The European Court of
Human Rights ("Court") gives considerable deference to the Member States to
regulate surrogacy and ART's because the Court is usually reluctant to get
involved in reproductive technology law debates, preferring to leave coverage
of sensitive policies to the Member States. 48 The Court will intervene,
however, in instances of Convention violations.49 Strong social support for the
child's best interestsso combined with the increasingly wide interpretation of
the right to privacy and family lifes' provide ample justification for the Court
to limit the ability of Member States to deny the effects of foreign decisions.
Here, the Court limits the ability of France to deny the effects of a judicial
decision regarding surrogacy issued abroad in the United States. While the
Court does not legitimize surrogacy agreements, it implies that the biological
father-child relationship established in the United States should be similarly
recognized in France.52
C. U.S. AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
The United States is characterized by a salient lack of federal
The Centers for Disease
regulation regarding reproductive technologies.
Drug Administration
and
Food
Control and Prevention ("CDC") and the
("FDA") regulate only the safety of technological devices used in ART, not
the overall use of such devices. 5 4 At the state level, the government
1991, no. 90-20.105.
46. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [Civil Code], Art. 16-7 (Fr.).
47. European Court of Human Rights Press Release 185, Totally prohibiting the
establishment of a relationship between a father and his biological children born following
surrogacy arrangements abroad was in breach of the Convention 3 (June 26, 2014).
48. Id.
49. Here, "Convention" means the European Convention of Human Rights.

50. The principle of "child's best interest" is a legal concept often used by the court in its
decisions. In 1996, the Court underlined the importance of this principle susceptible to
override the parents' decisions in Johansen v. Norway. 23 Eur. H.RE. Rep. 33.
51.

European Convention of Human Rights, Art. 8.

52. The Court held that, by not recognizing the biological father as the legal father of the
children, France violated the child's, not the intended parents' rights, rights). Mennesson v.
France, App. No. 65192/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 100-101 (2004), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-145389#{ "itemid":["001-145389"]}.
53. See, e.g., Kirsten Riggan, Regulation (or lack thereof) of assisted reproductive
technologies in the U.S. and abroad (Mar. 4, 2011), https://cbhd.org/content/regulation-or-

lack-thereof-assisted-reproductive-technologies-us-and-abroad.
54. The CDC must release an annual report on infertility procedures and their success

rates; the FDA is responsible for approving certain products (drugs, biological products and
medical devices if they meet specific conditions) before they can enter the market and for
testing reproductive tissues before they are implanted. See AM. Soc'Y OF REPROD. MED.,
OVERSIGHT OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 5 (2010), available at https://www.
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regulates medical activity, which includes medical treatments to infertility,
through licensing of practitioners, including suspension and revocation of
licenses in instances of malpractice.55 Finally, the use of reproductive
technology is left to the self-regulation of the medical profession, such as
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine., which issues standards
regarding the use of in vitro fertilization.
Compared to European
countries, the U.S. is viewed as a highly permissive country toward ART.57
John A. Robertson, Professor at University of Texas Law School and Chair
of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, when comparing the German and U.S. approaches to
reproductive technology, notes "the reception of ARTs in the United States
cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation of the country's
long tradition of individual liberty, free market and free enterprise
orientation, and grants of wide autonomy to physicians and other
professionals." 58 Thus, American social values, as influenced by economic
principles, more easily accept unregulated reproductive technologies and
generally place more trust in the medical profession. In fact, in 2012, over
1% of all infants born in the U.S. were conceived through the use of
assisted reproductive technologies. 59
Surrogacy is also a form of ART. Laws surrounding surrogacy
agreements vary greatly from state to state. Some states, for instance,
issued statutes that declare surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable
(e.g., Louisiana), or even penalize parties to a surrogate contract (e.g., New
York), while others distinguish between paid and unpaid surrogacy (e.g.,
Washington). Some states allow but regulate surrogacy (e.g., Florida) and
some states are simply silent on the matter (e.g., Colorado).60 Today, the
U.S. (together with Canada) is the favorite destination of French couples
seeking surrogacy.6 1 These discrepancies in law, theory, social values, and
practice, both in the United States and France, illustrate the need for

asrm.org/uploadedFiles/Content/AboutUs/Media-andPublicAffairs/OversiteOfART%20
%282%29.pdf.
55. AM. Soc'Y OF REPROD. MED., supra note 54, at 5. Although it must be noted that
some states issued specific regulations regarding reproductive technology. See infra Part
L.C. on surrogacy agreements.
56. AM. SOC'Y OF REPROD. MED., supra note 54, at 5.
57. Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra note 44, at 19 1.

58. Id.
59. U.S.

DEPT. OF

HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERV.,

CTR. FOR

DISEASE CONTROL AND

PREVENTION, ART SUCCESS RATES (Aug. 2015), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2013report/art-2013-fertility-clinic-report.pdf.
60. Surrogacy laws in the United States, MILWAUKEE-WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL
(Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/health/163772546.html; Guide to State
Surrogacy Laws, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/women/news/2007/12/1 7/3758/guide-to-state-surrogacy-laws/.
61. Estelle Saget, Gestation pour autrui: lafiliereamericaine, L'EXPRESS (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:01

AM), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/famille/gestation-pour-autrui-la-filiere-americaine
1603640.html.
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establishing uniform regulations before, or if ever, ectogenesis is a widely
used practice.
II. REDETERMINING THE STATUS OF EMBRYOS
A. RENEWAL OF THE ABORTION DEBATE
Scholars initially limited their considerations of the potential legal
implications of artificial wombs to the consequences on the topical subject
of the abortion debate. The possibility for the embryo to survive outside
the woman's body-although relying on another kind of "host," the
ectogenetic incubator-implies profound changes, especially in the U.S., in
the way abortion is regulated. The American standards for abortion were
set by the landmark decision Roe v. Wade, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
("Supreme Court") recognized the constitutional right to have an
abortion.6 2 Roe, and the subsequent case Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,
established two main principles: the right to abortion as an extension of the
woman's right to privacy,64 and the viability standard. Both principles are
threatened by the introduction of artificial wombs in several respects.
First, the principle of viability means that a state has a legitimate
interest in preventing a woman from terminating her pregnancy once the
embryo is deemed viable. 66 For the Supreme Court, the line of viability
must be drawn at "the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb."6 It must be noted
that an increasing number of studies suggest that a fetus is deemed
viable after only twenty-two weeks of gestation. 6 8 Also notable is that
judges have long acknowledged that the viability standard largely
depends on the medical advances existing at the time of the litigation in
question. 69 Certainly, none of the Justices at the time of the Roe and
Casey decisions were imagining of the genuine possibility of the
62. More specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Texas criminal abortion statute
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the abortion decision,
at least during the first semester of pregnancy, belonged to the pregnant woman and her

attending physician. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) ("For the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.").
63. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
64. Id. at 871 ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most
central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot
renounce.").

65. Id. at 870 ("We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the

woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.").
66. See e.g., Hyun Jee Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling
Viability's DoctrinalAmbiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (2005).

67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
68. See e.g., Marlow, supra note 24, at 1856-1857.
69. See e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate
existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.").
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creation of ectogenetic incubators. Yet, as Sacha Zimmerman noted,
such technology will render fetuses technically viable70 as soon as they
are conceived,' since they can potentially be removed from the woman's
womb and be successfully maintained alive in an ectogenetic incubator. 72
Conception, on the other hand, is widely understood as the moment from
successful fertilization of the egg.73 Therefore, a woman's right to an
abortion could potentially be challenged by the State at any point of the
pregnancy because viability would be determined as the moment of
conception. Several scholars, however, temper this view and argue that it
is very unlikely in practice.74
The availability of artificial wombs would mark a decisive turning
point in the right to abortion as an integral component of the woman's right
to privacy. Tension exists as to whether the right to abortion is a right of
evacuation ("the right not to be pregnant") or a right of termination ("the
right not to procreate").
Until now, the distinction was purely theoretical
as it was not possible to actually dissociate evacuation from termination of
the embryo. However, the science of ectogenesis suggests that a fetus can
be extracted from a woman's womb and be quickly re-implanted in an
artificial womb, escaping the "death" of an abortion. If we consider that a
woman only has a right of evacuation in the name of her bodily integrity,
the only power she should have over her pregnancy is to decide whether or
not she wishes to pursue it; the survival of the embryo, however, would fall
outside of the scope of her decisional power.76 As a consequence, the
government could require the extraction of the fetus and his or her
successful placement into an ectogenetic incubator, followed by a
placement for adoption. These challenges to the principles at the core of
the rationale of Roe and Casey led the most audacious commentators to
claim that artificial wombs could well mark "the end of abortion." 77
The rise of artificial wombs also has the potential to equalize parental
rights regarding decisions on the fate of the unborn child, as the gestation
70. The term "viable" is used here with the U.S. Supreme Court's own definition (i.e.,
capable of living outside the mother's womb). See supra note 67.
71. S. Zimmerman, Fetal Position - The Real Threat to Roe v. Wade, THE NEW REP.,
(Aug. 18 2003), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/fetal-position.
72. This also requires great advances in fetal surgery allowing surgeons to remove a fetus
from a natural womb and successfully re-implant it in an artificial one. ATLAN, supra note
7, at 44.
73. There is an ongoing debate on the meaning of the term "conception." In Australia, the
Children's Court of Queensland issued a particularly interesting decision in which the meaning
of "conception" is discussed. See LWV & another v LMH [2012] QChC 26 (Austl.).
74. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 199.
75. CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, THE ETHICS OF ABORTION, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN LIFE,
AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE 245 (2015); Alghrani, supra note 12, at 196.

76. KACZOR, supra note 75, at 256.

77. However the majority of the doctrine finds it unlikely, as such a coercive power between
the hands of the govemment would violate the parents' right to privacy and rights to chose
different medical procedures, among other things. See Alghrani, supra note 12, at 199.
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would be carried by "a neutral agent." 78 If the right of termination, as
described earlier, survives, the woman will no longer be the ultimate
decision-maker when it comes to abortion since her bodily integrity will
not be at stake. 79 But what is an abortion in the ectogenetic world? Can a
couple simply ask for the machine to be switched off once gestation has
already started? Would the action of "switching off' the machine be
subject to abortion laws? Would therapeutic claims for abortion be
different, as the physiology of the fetus would be potentially observable
throughout gestation? To answer these important questions, regulators
must balance the parents' rights with the ectogenetic embryo's interests.
B. PROTECTION OF THE ECTOGENETIC EMBRYO
The road to (relatively)80 autonomous fetal existence will lead the
public decision-makers to reexamine a fundamental issue: legal status of
the embryo.8' There are two main issues to be addressed in light of
ectogenesis: First, against what types of harm should ectogenetic embryos
be protected? Second, would the attribution of personhood be a satisfying
legal response?
The law must protect ectogenetic embryos against physical harm
without involving the woman's bodily integrity since, by definition, the
existence of the ectogenetic embryo is physically independent from the
woman's body. This is a particularly important issue under French law,
where the physical harm done to the unborn child only gives rise to civil
compensation or criminal sanctions in the name of the pregnant woman,
although the subsequent birth of the live child may trigger retroactive legal
effects. 8 2 In the U.S., most states have fetal homicide laws, which define
the fetus as a "person"83 for the purpose of criminal proceedings involving
harm done to a pregnant woman that resulted in the death of the fetus she
was carrying. 84 Under both U.S. and French law, human embryos occupy
an "interim category," being considered as more than mere human tissue,
but less than actual persons.85 The arrival of artificial wombs reinforces
that regulators must put an end to the status quo, whereby fetuses in
78. Id.
79. Schultz, supra note 13, at 883-84.
80. The fetus is not completely autonomous since it cannot exist entirely on its own; its
survival and growth depends on a matrix that imitates the characteristics of a natural womb.
81. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 198
82. See e.g., Statut de l'embryo et dufoetus (Rapport de l'Universite de Droit Paris V),
LE JOURNAL DES FEMMES, http://sante-medecine.journaldesfemmes.com/contents/730-

statut-de-1-embryon-et-du-foetus-universite-de-droit-paris-5#1-rsquo-incertitude-du-statut
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015)
83. For instance, the Criminal Code of Alabama defines a person as "a human being,
including an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability."
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(3) (2006).
84. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES [NCSL], FETAL HOMICIDE LAws (Mar. 2015),

http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx.
85. Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Uteri Embryo: Implications for
Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 309 (2006).
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86

gestation belong to a legal grey zone.
In addition, embryos' protection must be reflected in a robust and
consistent liabilities system.97
For instance, who should be held
responsible if there is a power outage affecting the incubators? And to
what extent should they be responsible if the ectogenetic fetuses die as a
result?88 These considerations make a clear distinction between embryos
growing in ectogenetic incubators to meet a parental project 89 and embryos
subject to alteration for research purposes. 90 This will spur regulators to
consider the possibility of scientific research on growing embryos as
opposed to frozen embryos.91
Another issue is the destination of the ectogenetic fetus if the couple
that initiated the gestation subsequently separate or is no longer willing to
pursue its parental project. Ectogenesis would force the courts (and quite
possibly the Legislature) to strictly regulate the right to terminate the
gestation of the fetus growing in the ectogenetic incubator. Contrary to
abortion of a fetus growing in the mother's womb, termination of an
ectogenetic fetus gives rise to a situation in which both parents are a priori
equals in the decision to terminate the gestation. Thus, some authors
suggest drawing inspiration for the disposition of ectogenetic fetuses from
existing law surrounding frozen embryos. 9 2 Yet, contrary to frozen
embryos, ectogenetic fetuses are already implanted, growing and engaged
in the process of meeting a parental project (many frozen embryos will in
fact never be implanted and a portion of them will be destroyed).

86. The vagueness surrounding the status of embryos is exacerbated by the use of confusing
terms in the law, such as the inclusion of fetuses in the definition of "persons" in 38 State criminal
law, which was turned into an argument by pro-life advocates. See NCSL, supra note 84.
87. Schultz developed interesting comments on the potential application of existing legal
doctrines to the situation of artificial wombs. Schultz, supra note 13, at 894.
88. "Assume that the machine will always work, electricity will never fail, and technicians
will never tum the wrong switch or go off on a coffee break at the critical moment." G. COREA,
THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO

ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 254 (1979).
89. The term "parental project" is used in French law to distinguish between supemumerary

embryos that will be later implanted to become a child (meeting therefore the parental project of
the couple who initiated the conception of the embryo) and supernumerary embryos that will
either be destroyed or donated for the purposes of research with the consent of the couple. CODE
DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [C.S.P.] [code of public health], Art. L.2141-3 (Fr.).
90. Human embryo research is permitted both in France and in the U.S. under specific
conditions. There is an interesting polemic against President Obama for allowing funding in

2009 to the National Institutes of Health on embryonic stem cell provided, notably, that the
embryos

subject to alteration

were initially created for reproductive

purposes and

subsequently donated for research. Doe v. Obama, 670 F. Supp.2d 435, 438 (D. Md. 2009);
Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 F.R. § 32,170 (July 7, 2009) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 46.201-207).
91. Should such experiments be allowed? If yes, how should they be framed and until
which stage of development should a growing embryo be subject to destruction for scientific
purposes? Legislatures will have to give a clear answer on these ethical, and likely highly
controversial questions.

92. See e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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Therefore, respect for fetal life in the early stages of gestation requires the
law to limit the parents' potential arbitrary decisions regarding the fate of
the ectogenetic fetus, considering in addition that the separation of the fetus
from a human womb (either the natural mother or a surrogate) can
potentially cause the parents to feel less involved, less attached, and
therefore consider the "pregnancy" as "less real." In fact, before allowing
for the use of artificial wombs, the regulators must determine from which
point there should be "no going back"-namely, whether the couple's
consent to pursue the gestation until birth is irrevocable once the embryo is
3
successfully placed in the artificial womb. 9 The Legislature would need to
consider when there may be exceptions to this irrevocable consent, such as
for therapeutic or extreme familial situations.

C. CHANGES REQUIRED IN FRENCH AND U.S. LEGISLATION
The externalization of human gestation will shed a new light on the
debates involving the beginning of human life and the attribution of
personhood. Although applying the attribution of personhood to a fetus
from conception is appealing, especially at a time when fetuses can
94
potentially grow outside the woman's body, it is not the most satisfying
solution to ensure protection of ectogenetic fetuses.
The question of "the beginning of human life" is extremely complex
and does not trigger a clear consensus. 5 According to the statement issued
by the U.S. Congressional Report of 1981, which was supported by
multiple medical, biological and scientific writings, the meeting of the
human gametes creates a "being that is alive and is a member of the human
species., 96 From a philosophical point of view, human embryos do not
have the "conscious self-awareness" that characterize the human species;
however, they bear in themselves the potential to become a rational being.
The beginning of human life, therefore, could be essentially a matter of
definition, being or potential being.9 7 There are paramount practical
consequences related to the attribution of personhood beyond the
theoretical abstractions as to the beginning moment of human life. In
particular, the law protects the right to life and the bodily integrity of every
human being, 98 and provides them more generally with constitutional
rights. 99 Therefore, attributing the personhood to embryos from the
93. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 203.
94. On that point, "[tihe Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutional status of
embryos outside of the body and most states have no law on the matter." John Robertson,
Embryo Stem Cell Research: Ten Years of Controversy, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 191, 193

(2010) (emphasis added).
95. See supra Part II.A.
96. S. COMM. ON SEPARATIONOF POWERS, S. REP. NO. 97-158, at 7 (1981).
97. KACZOR, supra note 75, at 41.

98. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] [civil code], Art. 16 ("Legislation ensures the primacy of the
person, prohibits any infringement of the latter's dignity, and guarantees respect for the
human being from the outset of his life") (Fr.).
99. The Supreme Court "has ruled without a dissenting voice that fetuses are not persons
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, and thus do not have constitutional rights as
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moment of conception would be very problematic for the sake of
embryonic research, embryonic selection, or abortion. In addition, it would
be absurd and extremely procedurally burdensome to consider each one of
the thousand of frozen embryos stored in a fertility clinic's chamber as a
100
person.
The grey area that surrounds the status of the embryos in both France
and the U.S. leads to an unbearable legal uncertainty that will likely be
exacerbated with the creation of artificial wombs. As highly publicized
incidents involving fetuses in gestation or frozen embryos have made their
way to the courtrooms or into the Legislature, forcing lawmakers to decide
issues under intense social and political constraints, a patchwork of
confusing and inconsistent standards has emerged.' 0 ' The current case-bycase approach is unsuitable because it does not take into account the
situation of ectogenetic embryos, and should be replaced with the creation
of a range of clear and innovative legal statuses specific to the embryos.
These new statuses should be distinguished from the existing categories of
"persons" and "things." Embryo status should be flexible enough to allow
research and abortion/termination to a certain degree,1 0 2 while otherwise
ensuring sufficient legal protection of the embryos. This legal protection
should vary depending on different factors, justifying the creation of
several statuses (or subcategories) rather than a single standard: one could,
for instance, distinguish between "pre-implantation" embryos (fertilized
eggs, frozen embryos) and "post-implantation" embryos (embryos
successfully attached to a womb), which could be further separated
between "intracorporeal" and "ectogenetic" embryos. This set of new legal
statuses would better serve the purposes of the law because it takes into
consideration the special place of embryos in the legal field rather than
reducing them to an interim category,' 3 and would be more suited to
respond to the various and increasingly complex situations involving
embryos and fetuses.
III. REDEFINING THE CONCEPT OF PARENTHOOD

A.

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL WOMBS AND
SURROGACY

In Huxley's ectogenetic world, the concept of family is an archaic
such." One could wonder whether this reveals a "catch-22" situation, where the very reason
the Court does not grant personhood to embryos is to prevent them from acquiring
constitutional rights. Roberts, Embryo Stem Cell Research, supra note 94 (emphasis added).
100. Imagine, for instance, if frozen embryos had standing in court. The question was
raised in Doe v. Obama, where the Court denied standing on the ground that it could not
identify the embryo-plaintiffs particularized harm. Doe v. Obama, 670 F. Supp.2d at 160.
Once again, the arrival of artificial wombs may reopen the debate due to the fact that
ectogenetic embryos will be clearly identifiable once placed in the incubators.
101. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 200 (laws designed to protect embryos arose in the
context of specific cases).

102. The right of abortion is limited in France and in the U.S., see supra Part II.B.
103. This creative legal status is does not aim at imposing any scientific truth and therefore
is a legal fiction.
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notion, recalling a primitive model of society.1'4 The emergence of
reproductive technologies, however, actually has the potential to reinforce
the family spirit.105 An Australian surrogacy case decided in 2012 was
introduced with these words: "[the child carried by the surrogate] is a
long awaited and precious gift, much loved by his family and a miracle of
modem medicine." 0 6
In surrogacy, a surrogate, also called a gestational carrier, agrees to
bear a child for a commissioning couple, also called the intended
parents. 0 7 The child can be conceived using the gametes of the intended
parents, donors' gametes, or one parent's gametes associated with one
donor's gametes, including the surrogate's own egg, which would lead to
"traditional surrogacy" as opposed to "gestational surrogacy." 08 In
gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is artificially implanted with an
For surrogacy
embryo conceived through in vitro fertilization.' 0 9
pregnancies, an explicit agreement is signed between the parties
involved in the process. Essentially, through such an agreement, the
gestational carrier agrees to carry with all due diligence the intended
parents' child in exchange for compensation.'lo The enforceability of
surrogacy agreements, however, even where they are deemed legal, is
subject to great controversy."
The similarities between ectogenetic incubators and existing
surrogacy agreements justify the common application of some broad
principles. First, ectogenetic incubators can be an alternative for
surrogacy," 2 and as such, their use can give rise to the same parentage

104. HUXLEY, supra note 4.

105. For Chantal Collard, professor emeritus at Concordia, Montr6al, who specialized in
parentage, and Frangoise Zonabend, an anthropologist who specialized in European societies,
the rise of assisted reproductive technology did not destroy the notions of family and filiation.
On the contrary, it gave birth to a new structure of the family where "the child 'makes' the
parents." CHANTAL COLLARD AND FRANtOISE ZONABEND, LA PARENT 89, 102 (2015).

106. LWV& another vLMH [2012] QChC 26 (Austl.).
107. SUSAN

L.

CROCKIN,

ESTABLISHING

PARENTAGE

IN

GESTATIONAL

CARRIER

ARRANGEMENTS § 3.1 (2nd ed. 2009).
108. Id. §3.1- 3.2.
109. Id.
I 10. Two types of monetary compensation are generally distinguished: payment for medical,
legal and psychological expenses reasonably incurred by the surrogacy itself versus extra
payment to a surrogate and an agency thereby creating a "commercial surrogacy." Certain States
expressly prohibit commercial surrogacy due to its potentially exploitative nature. See e.g.,
Katherine Drabiak, et al., Ethics, Law and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call For Unformity, 35

J.L. MED. & ETHICS 301 (2007) (discussing how many companies are using the internet to
circumvent state laws and exploit the lack of federal regulation of surrogacy).
Ill. In the U.S., laws regarding the enforceability of surrogacy agreements vary greatly from a
state to another. See supra Part I.C. Other countries, such as the U.K., adopted innovative
solutions, including where the surrogate must reconfirm after the birth that she wants to give up

the child to the commissioning couple, regardless of the terms stipulated in the surrogacy
agreement. Surogacy Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49, § 2 (Eng.).
112. Rosen, supra note 27, at 71.
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consequences. When surrogacy is successful,11 3 neither the surrogate
nor the eventual donors involved in the process have any parenting role
toward the child. Instead, the intended parents are recognized as the
child's legal parents.' 14 This recognition can occur through different
legal means, which have developed over the time and could be used in
the situation of artificial wombs, such as a pre-birth order.15
Second, the promise of artificial wombs could have considerable
advantages over classic surrogacy. The use of ectogenetic incubators
would suppress any concern regarding the gestational carrier's
subsequent withdrawal of consent or willingness to pursue the
pregnancy when the intended parents want it terminated." 6
Additionally, the use of ectogenetic machines protects surrogacy
mothers from psychological or economic exploitation by completely
removing them from the equation.'' 7
Despite its perceived advantages, the use of ectogenesis in lieu of
surrogacy is not immune from constraints for the intended parents. Their
decisions toward the ectogenetic child might, in this author's opinion, be
monitored and contested in order to protect the fetus, even in the absence of
a human surrogate. Interferences occur by operation of law, considerations
of the medical team in charge of the artificial womb, or, more prosaically,
the realities of the marketplace, specifically that artificial wombs
potentially represent a lucrative business." 8
Notwithstanding these
constraints, the final agreement between the intended parents will not
necessarily be enforceable in court, just like existing contracts determining
the ownership of frozen embryos are sometimes held unenforceable for
policy reasons.' 19
113. Here, "successful" means that the surrogacy process occurred peacefully, in a place where
it is legal, and that the surrogate is willing to give up her legal rights on the child to the benefit of
the intended parents even after the birth, etc.
114. See e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (where the court held that the
woman "who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of
a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law.").
115. Pre-birth orders present multiple advantages. See Crockin, supra note 107, at § 3.2.2.
116. Recent cases showed the complexity of such situations from both legal and ethical
standpoints. See e.g., Aly Neel, Surrogatemother refused abortion: right? Wrong? Damned to
hell?, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-thepeople/wp/2013/03/06/surrogate-mother-refused-abortion-right-wrong-damned-to-hell/
(the
surrogate who refuses the abortion of the unborn child who presents severe medical conditions,
although it was stipulated in the agreement between her and the intended parents, could
physically seek refuge in a State that does not recognize such agreements).
117. Rosen, supra note 27, at 71. As Roger B. Dworkin said, "[t]he same concerns about
women-that surrogacy reifies them, that these arrangements take psychological or
economic advantage of them-that whole range of concerns is gone when you talk about
artificial wombs." Id.
118. Indeed, the presumably high costs associated with ectogenesis would in practice
prevent many persons from using artificial wombs as they wish.
119. Schultz, supra note 13, at 889-90 (2010). Schultz draws a parallel between situations
where the fate of frozen embryos is uncertain due to the separation of the couple that
initiated the parental project or the death of one of them. She also compares cases with
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B. NEW CONCEPTION OF MOTHERHOOD

Mater semper certa est. This Roman maxim translates as, "The mother
is always certain" (as opposed to the father). Based on this maximalthough it is highly called into question now that in vitro fertilization is
available' 20-French law established its main principles regarding filiation.
The arrival of artificial wombs will likely be the final stone burying French
family law in the tomb of obsolescence.
The Cour de Cassation formally recalled in 2011 that "the principle
under French law is that the mother of the child is the one who gives
birth."'2 2 This conception of maternity is consistent with the wording of
the French Civil Code. Article 332 allows maternity to be contested "by
proving that the mother did not give birth to the child."1 23 Also, under
French law, biology (here referring to the process of pregnancy) trumps
genetics regarding motherhood. Indeed, a woman might use an egg donor
and be the legal mother of the child to whom she gave birth. However, the
woman who seeks surrogacy will not be recognized as the legal mother of
the child under French law, even if the child has been conceived with her
own egg.1 24 This approach is consistent with the refusal of the French
administration to recognize the legal effects of surrogacy agreements
concluded abroad.1 25
The French approach to motherhood is questionable in several respects.
First, it introduces an unequal treatment between women and men, for
whom biology and genetics are naturally intertwined regarding procreation.
A good illustration of this unequal treatment lies in the fact that the genetic
father of a child conceived through surrogacy abroad must now be
recognized as the child's legal father in France following the mediatized
Mennesson case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in
2014,126 whereas the intended mother seems barred from this possibility. 12 7
different outcomes regarding the enforceability of the ownership contracts. Id.
120. Since a woman can give birth to a child conceived thanks to an egg donation.

121. The arrival of artificial wombs will likely be the final stone burying all European
&

See Richard F. Storrow, The Phantom Children of the Republic:
family law.
InternationalSurrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20(3) J. OF GENDER, SOC'L POL'Y

THE L. 561, 594 (2012).
122. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], le civ., Apr. 6, 2011,
Bull. civ. 1, No. 72 (Fr.).
123. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] [civil code], Art. 332 (Fr.).
124. Since surrogacy is not recognized in France, without distinction based on the
potential genetic relation. See supra lB.

125. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], le civ., Dec. 17, 2008,
Bull. civ. I, no. 289 (Fr.) (where the national court gave right to the French authorities that
refused to enter the birth certificates resulting from a surrogacy agreement in the French

register of births).
126. Mennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 100-101 (2004), availableat
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00 I - 145389# {"itemid":["00 1-145389"] }; European Court of
Human Rights Press Release 185, Totally prohibiting the establishment of a relationship
between a father and his biological children born following surrogacy arrangements abroad
was in breach of the Convention 4 (June 26, 2014) ("In thus preventing the recognition and

establishment of the children's legal relationship with their biological father, the French
State had overstepped the permissible margin of appreciation"). One must note that it is
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This inequality will likely be exacerbated with the use of artificial wombs:
It might be far easier for the biological father to be recognized as the legal
parent of the ectogenetic child than the non-gestational mother, although
the child may also carry her genes. Second, the availability of artificial
wombs will create a novel legal dilemma, as the child whose gestation
would have entirely occurred in an incubator will be technically born to a
"machine." The current state of French law implies an absurd situation
where the only potential "natural" mother of the child is not a human being.
C. CHANGES REQUIRED IN U.S. AND FRENCH LEGISLATION

Some philosophers have argued that artificial wombs will mark a new
era in women's social liberation 2 8 by "freeing . .. women from the tyranny
of their reproductive biology." 29 From a parenting perspective however,
artificial wombs could well represent a new burden, especially for women.
In light of the two problematic situations previously described,1 30 the
French Legislature is called to review the core concept of motherhood in
the perspective of artificial wombs, while the U.S. Legislature is called to
further the change it already initiated under the influence of surrogacy
agreements.
One potential answer would be to consider the ectogenetic incubator as
the extension of the intended mother's uterus. However, this is a legal
fiction because there is no physical connection between the mother's uterus
and the artificial womb, and will therefore be subject to many theoretical
and practical problems. Considering the ectogenetic incubator only as the
"extension" of a woman's (functional or dysfunctional) uterus is denying
males, who by nature do not have a uterus, the right to use the machine to
satisfy their wish to have a child on their own. 13' Another imperfect
unclear what the solution should be if the child was conceived through sperm-donation.
127. In the cases previously mentioned, the European Human Rights Court ("ECHR")
condemned France regarding the filiation with the biological fathers only. See supra note 123.
Therefore, it appears French authorities are free to continue denying the intended mother the
same right of filiation, even though the child in question might be her genetic child (if she
provided her egg for the IVF). Once again, this inequity could be justified by the natural
differences between female and male reproduction. See the biology/genetics discussion supra
in Part IlI.B. However, it is unclear what the ECHR means by "biological parentage," which is
viewed as a necessary component of each individual's identity justifying the condemnation of
France. Press release, supra note 126, at 4. Is a genetic but non-gestational mother a
biological mother for the Court? This raises the urgent need for a new definition of parentage.
See infra Part IlI.C.
128.

See e.g.,

PETER SINGER

&

DEANE WELLS,

ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB

TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 21 (2006) ("[W]e think women

will be helped, rather than harmed, by the development of a technology that makes it
possible for them to have children without being pregnant.").
129.

SHULAMITH FRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970).

130. See supra Part IlI.B.
131. Artificial wombs could be the opportunity for male gay couples, or single men
(although in France, assisted reproductive technologies are only opened to couples), to
further reduce the presence of a woman in the equation of reproduction; the only female
"contribution" would be the egg donation (until science finds they way to artificially create

Winter 2016]

ARTIFICIAL WOMBS

21

solution would be to offer intended parents to adopt their ectogenetic child
upon his or her birth. This solution is imperfect because adoption is a
burdensome process both in France and in the U.S. and it is absurd for a
couple, who provided its genetic materials and initiated the conception of
the child, to adopt him/her upon his/her birth. A more suitable solution
would be to broaden the existing definition of parents and found the use of
the artificial womb on the preexisting model of surrogacy agreements. The
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services issued a policy alert on October
28, 2014 formally stating that a "natural mother" or a "natural father" is a
genetic parent or gestational parent.1 3 2 Ideally, regulations should
supplement these efforts and recognize "intended" parents (as opposed to
purely "genetic" or "gestational" parents) as potential legal parents. The
recognition of "intended" parents as legal parents would reflect the change
in the social conception of parenthood brought about by assisted
reproduction.133
The formal creation of the legal category of "intended parents" will
require the implementation of robust safeguards against potential fraud.
The definition of "intention" must be broad enough to answer the needs of
the intended parents of an ectogenetic baby regardless of their genetic
connections with the child.1 34 On the other hand, it should be strict enough
to prevent unscrupulous individuals from claiming a parentage right on any
ectogenetic child. The development of "pre-birth orders"'3 5 could help
secure the parent-child relationship and discourage potential fraud or child
trafficking. Such an order should be subject to stringent conditions in order
to protect the ectogenetic child, and the administrative process may benefit
in borrowing concepts and procedures from both acknowledgment and
adoption. 3 6

an egg from the genetic material contained in a sperm).
132. U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, POLICY ALERT PA-2014-009 (Oct. 28,
2014), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Updates/20141028-ART.pdf. The use of this
definition, while there are many under the law in the U.S., is interesting because it
acknowledges the separation between genetics and gestation.
133. See e.g,. COLLARD AND ZONABEND, supra note 105, at 6.
134. This is important because intended parents may have used donors' gametes to conceive.
135. Previously mentioned regarding surrogacy in the U.S. See supra Part III.A and
CROCKIN, supra note 107, at § 3.1.
136. In France, acknowledgment of paternity and acknowledgment of maternity are
opened to the members of an unmarried couple before the birth of the child. CODE CIVIL [C.

Civ.] [Civil Code], Art. 316 (Fr.). However, such filiation can be later contested by proving
that they are not the "natural" parents of the child. CODE CIVIL [C. ClV.] [Civil Code], Art.

333-335 (Fr.). The mechanism of adoption both in France and in the U.S. allows restricting
the people eligible to establish an adoptive filiation. Although it is not developed in this
article, one could imagine a similar-but lighter-procedure, where a committee would
decide whether a couple or a person should access the artificial womb. I suggest that the
administrative process borrow concepts from both acknowledgement and adoption law in
order to settle on a middle ground that is more restrictive but more protective of the parents
than simple acknowledgement, but less restrictive than adoption.
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IV. REGULATING THE ACCESS TO THE TECHNOLOGY
A. RISE OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS AND ETHICAL FEARS

The difficulty with regulating access to ectogenetic technology lies in
the interaction of conflicting rights' 37 and fears for uncertain ethical
potential. The role of public decision-makers is particularly tricky and
requires rational consideration of various elements to strike a fair balance.
This article works on the assumption that hard law138 is the best tool to
regulate access to artificial wombs; however, such regulation may also
occur through medical deontology, private markets, or economic
incentives.
U.S. and the French regulators must determine who is likely to use this
new generation of reproductive technology. Three main ranges of potential
users will be distinguished for the purpose of this article. The first category
of potential users is women affected by medical conditions so serious that
they render the possibility of pregnancy highly unlikely, impossible, or
potentially life-threatening. 139 The second category of potential users is
single men and homosexual male couples. Currently, gay male couples'
parenting options are limited to (if not prohibited in their country of
residency) adoption and surrogacy with a donor's egg.140 Artificial wombs
represent for these couples a valuable mechanical substitute for a female
womb. 14 1 The third category of potential users is women who do not wish
to be pregnant for purely personal and/or professional reasons. Personal
reasons range from personal comfort to consideration of the constraints
traditionally associated with pregnancy and post-pregnancy (pain of
delivery, weight gain, stretch marks, etc.). 142 Also, pregnancy might
prevent some women from working full time, or cause them to take an
extended amount of time off of their career. For some women, multiple
137. That is to say mainly the rights of the fetus and the rights of each of the intended parents.
138. The deliniation of hard law/soft law is commonly used when dealing with
international law. Hard law is defined as creating a legally binding obligation, as opposed
to soft law, which are quasi-legal polocies. See e.g., Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer,
InternationalSoft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010).
139. For example, a woman who underwent a hysterectomy due to uterine cancer or

women who suffered multiple miscarriages due to problems at the stage of embryo
implantation or women inclined to develop pre-eclampsia at some stage of their pregnancy.
Rosen, supra note 27, at 71. See also Alghrani, supra note 12, at 204 (Amel Alghrani also

refers to diseases such as pre-eclampsia, gestational diabetes and HLLP syndrome).
140. In France, gay couples have only been able to adopt a child since 2013; surrogacy for
gay couples, however, is still prohibited. Loi no. 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le
mariage aux couples de personnes de mime sexe [Law 2013-404 of May 17, 2013 for the
prupose of opening marriage to same-sex couples], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA R PUBLlQUE
FRAN'AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTEOF FRANCE], May 18, 2013, p. 8253.
141. Rifkin, supra note 30.
142. See also, J. S. Lyons, Artificial Wombs could take Pregnancy into Laboratory,

MERCURY NEWS 63 (Feb. 23, 2002), available at 2002 WL 14807658 ("Do we want a
society where if someone doesn't want to have stretch marks or weight gain, we use the
technology?").
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pregnancies could be a serious threat to their careers. 14 3
Ectogenetic regulations must balance government policy directives as
well as the individuals' interests it seeks to protect. Some scholars have
commented that the financial cost of using artificial wombs may be a
powerful barrier to access for most of the population.1 4 4 This raises the
question of whether it would be fair to allow only the richest individuals to
access this gestational technology, while the rest of the population will be
unable to afford it without further financial aid. One way to combat this
financial inequity would be to compel healthcare insurances to cover the
costs generated by the use of artificial wombs.1 4 5
Legislatures must also examine the potential ethical implications of the
use of, and access to, artificial wombs. A main controversy lies in the
extent to which the welfare of the child should justify, or on the contrary
deny, public access to artificial wombs. Ectogenetic incubators may be a
safer and healthier environment, as opposed to a human womb, for
embryos, thereby justifying public use and regulation of such incubators.1 4 6
This argument, however, reveals a terrifying possibility: imagine a child
whose condition has been seriously altered by his mother's conduct during
pregnancy, and, facing criminal charges, the prosecutor claims
infringement upon the fetus' right to gestation in a safe environment.
Could the court enjoin the mother to place the fetus in an incubator in the
name of the best interest of the child? Would the welfare of the fetus in
this situation justify the use of an ectogenetic incubator? Various ethicists
express concerns about the externalization of pregnancy, a crucial process
for the unborn child,1 4 7 and the mother-child relationship.148 The negative
consequences, if any, of artificial gestation on the psychological and
physical state of the ectogenetic child, as compared to a naturally gestated
child, are currently unknown.1 49 Would the welfare of the infant in this
case justify denial of public access to ectogenetic incubators?

143. On this point, see the offer of Facebook and Apple to finance egg-freezing for their
employees. Salam, supra note 10.
144. N. Unno, Development of an Artificial Placenta, in EXT SEX: ARS ELECTRONICA 2000
69-70 (G. Stocker & C. Shopf eds., 2000) (cited in L Aristarkhova, Ectogenesisand Mother
as Machine, 11(3) BDOY & SoC'Y 43, 46 (2005)).
145. As previously mentioned, the French social security system covers the cost of IVF. LE
COUT D'UNE FIV, supra note 41. However, insurance coverage for assisted reproductive
technology treatments remains rare in the United States. AMERICAN Soc'Y REPROD. MED.,
OVERSIGHT

OF ASSISTED

REPRODRODUCrIVE

TECHNOLOGY

(2010),

https://www.asrm.org/

uploadedFiles/Content/AboutUs/MediaandPublicAffairs/OversiteOfART/20%282%29.pdf.
146. Christine Rosen writes that embryos in artificial wombs are not threatened by the
consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs. Rosen, supra note 27, at 72. She also draws an
interesting parallel with the increasing use of genetic testing of unborn fetuses. Id.
147. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 206 ("because the technology is still in its early stages, it
is impossible to accurately predict the outcome it may have on the children involved in the
process.").

148. Rifkin, supra note 30.
149. Alghrani, supra note 12, at 206.
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Another persistent concern is the fear to fall into a "manufacture of
children" type of society.150 Rare but concerning stories already occurred
through the repeated use of surrogacy.'1' Also, Henri Atlan underlines that
artificial wombs will likely be associated with other controversial issues,
such as human cloning and baby designing through genetic selection,
rendered more easily accessible by the arrival of the ectogenetic
incubators.1 52 Unregulated access to artificial wombs could be an open
door to the industrialization of human procreation. To which extent should
these "slippery slope" arguments be taken into consideration by the public
decision-makers?
B. COMPARISON WITH ACCESS TO IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
A useful parallel can be drawn with the regulations of in vitro
fertilization. IVF is now widely accepted across the world and more than
five million babies have been successfully conceived through this
technique.1 53 Yet IVF's early stages were fraught with controversy. About
forty years ago, the conception of Louise Brown, the first "test-tube baby,"
raised many criticisms. 154 Will the gains artificial wombs represent
progressively outweigh their dangerous and unnatural aspect in public
opinion? Will this process of acceptance by society and its reflection in the
law through the regulation of access to the technology be even quicker now
that we have previously absorbed the idea of technological assisted human
conception?
Like IVF, ectogenetic technology has the potential to overcome a
natural inequality between fertile couples and infertile couples. Unlike
IVF, which focuses primarily on fertilization, ectogenetic technology
focuses on both the gestation period and fertilization. It addresses an
additional type of infertility: "gestational infertility," or the inability to
carry a pregnancy.' 55 We perceive gestation as more substantial than
150. Gene

Edward

Veith,

In loco parentis, 18(42)

WORLD

MAGAZINE

(2003),

http://www.worldmag.com/2003/ I/injloco-parentis.
151. In August 2014, Interpol launched an investigation into an alleged "baby factory" as a
Japanese businessman fathered 16 surrogate children.
Kevin Rawlinson, Interpol
investigates 'baby factory' as man fathers 16 surrogate children, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23,
2014, 8:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/aug/23/interpol-japanesebaby-factory-man-fathered-I 6-children.
152. ATLAN, supra note 7, at 87-88.
153. Kate Brian, The amazing story of IVF: 35 years and five million babies later, THE
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jul/
12/story-ivf-five-million-babies.
154. Louise Brown's birth was subject to important media coverage and generated strong
opposition against assisted reproduction among religious leaders and private citizens, some
calling her a "Frankenbaby" and sending her parents menacing mails. Victoria Ward, Louise
Brown, the first IVF baby, reveals family was bombarded with hate mail, THE TELEGRAPH
(July 24, 2015, 9:55 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/ I1760004/Louise-Brownthe-first-IVF-baby-reveals-family-was-bombarded-with-hate-mail.html.
155. "Gestational infertility" is my own term. The WHO, for instance, adopted another
classification of infertility that does not distinguish between the inability to become
pregnant and the inability to carry the pregnancy. WHO issues statements on use of
reversible hormonal contraception WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth.
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fertilization and it is widely recognized among prenatal specialists that an
important bond is created between the woman and the child growing month
after month in her womb. 156 What is unclear, however, is whether the
environment surrounding fertilization and the first cell divisions really
affect the development of the fetus. Social theorist Jeremy Rifkin notes
that, "[w]e know that young infants deprived of human touch and bodily
contact often are unable to develop the full range of human emotions and
sometimes die soon after birth or become violent, sociopathic or withdrawn
later in life."' 57 He pursues questioning the effects of growing a child in a
"plastic box" on his emotional and social development: "What kind of child
will we produce from a liquid medium inside a plastic box? How will
gestation in a chamber affect the child's motor functions and emotional and
cognitive development?"' 58
Nevertheless, it is superficial to perceive IVF technology as solely the
union of sperm and egg in a laboratory. In practice, IVF technology
implies further polemical elements such as the freeze, the destruction and
the potential for genetic testing of human embryos.' 5 9 Also, techniques
closely associated with IVF are foundational to the Legislature's ability to
frame access to the technology. Bearing that in mind, the gap between
artificial wombs and the current generation of assisted reproductive
technology-regarding both their morality and potential negative
consequences for the unborn child-is smaller than one might expect. As a
result, access to artificial wombs should not differ greatly from access to
IVF; the main difference, potentially, being the type of infertility they each
intend to treat. 160

In France, access to IVF is clearly circumscribed both in terms of who
can access it and for which purposes: only heterosexual couples, whose
members are both alive and in the reproductive age, can seek medical
assistance for reproduction.16' Besides, assisted reproductive technology
is designed solely, in the eyes of the French Legislature, to remedy a
medically diagnosed pathological infertility or to avoid transmitting to the
62
unborn child or the other member of the couple a very serious disease.1
This means that mere difficulty in conceiving a child or early menopause
does not grant a couple with automatic access to IVF. In the U.S., assisted
156. As a result, many experts advise prospective mothers to bond with their babies before
birth, arguing that it is an important part of their emotional and social development. See
e.g., Carol Sorgen, Bonding with baby before birth, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/
baby/features/bonding-with-baby-before-birth (last visited April 4, 2015).
157. Rifkin, supranote 30.
158. Id.
159. See e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological
Change: The Example ofIn Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 508 (2005).
160. At least in France where assisted reproductive technologies can only be used to cure a
couple's infertility. See supra Part I.B.
161. CODE DE LA SANTtPUBLIQUE [C.S.P] [code of public health], Art. L.2141-2 (Fr.).
162. Id. "Le caractbre pathologique de l'infertilit6 doit etre m~dicalement diagnostiqu&"
("The pathological character of infertility must be medically diagnosed"). Id.
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reproduction is much less regulated.1 63 The private market (doctors,
healthcare facilities) manages the service, using its own discretion to grant
or not the requests of its patients, but is still subject to the general rules of
torts and contracts.1 6 4
C. IMPLEMENTING REASONABLE LIMITATIONS?

Haldane imagined that France would be "the first country to adopt
ectogenesis officially, and by 1968 [would be] producing 60,000 children
annually by this method," however, "in most countries the opposition
[would be] far stronger."I1s In reality, France will likely be more reluctant
than the U.S. to broaden access to ectogenetic technology, assuming that
such technology is allowed in the first place. In fact, it is possible the
U.S. will not issue particular legislation designed to restrict the use of
artificial wombs. 16 6 But should the unregulated use of artificial wombs
raise more concerns that the unframed use of IVF? Can we rely solely
upon medical professionals to make the "right" choices when important
public policy issues are at stake? Both the French and the U.S. regulators
should intervene to frame the access to artificial wombs, however the
legal interventions should differ in several respects due to opposing
legislative cultures and views of reproductive technologies.
In France, artificial wombs will likely fall within the existing
provisions of Title IV of the Code of Public, which regulates assisted
reproductive technologies in general, unless artificial wombs are
considered as a technology so invasive that it would represent more than
a mere "assistance" to human reproduction.' 67 As with IVF, access to
artificial wombs would therefore be limited to pathologically infertile
couples.1 6 8 The mere fact that a man is naturally deprived of a uterus
does not make him "infertile" under French law,' although by the time
artificial wombs become available, French law may be revised due to
intern and international pressures.1 70 This article recommends the French
163. See e.g., Kirsten Riggan, Regulation (or lack thereoj) of assisted reproductive
technologies in the U.S. and abroad(Mar. 4, 2011), https://cbhd.org/content/regulation-orlack-thereof-assisted-reproductive-technologies-us-and-abroad (many commentators in fact
noticed that the U.S. implemented particularly few regulations compared to the other
developed countries).
164. Robertson, Embryo Stem Cell Research, supra note 94, at 203.
165. HALDANE, supra note 11, at 17.
166. See supra Part IV.B.
167. CODE DE LA SANTA PUBLIQUE [C.S.P.] [Code of Public Health], Title IV ("Assistance
m6dicale A la procreation") ("Medical Reproductive Assistance") (Fr.).
168. Id. Art. L.2141-2.
169. As a reminder, although same-sex couples have had the right to marry since 2013,
they are not entitled to access IVF under French law at this time.
170. The ECHR leaves a broad margin of appreciation to the Member States when it
comes to reproductive technologies; however the combination of Article 8 (right to privacy)
and Article 14 (antidiscrimination provision) could legitimate the Court's intervention to
ensure equal treatment of homosexual and heterosexual couples. See European Court of
Human Rights Press Release 185, Totally prohibiting the establishment of a relationship
between a father and his biological children born following surrogacy arrangements abroad
was in breach of the Convention 3 (June 26, 2014).
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Legislature broaden the definition of "infertility" so as to encompass the
physiological infertility of same-sex (male) couples and enable them to
access IVF and artificial wombs for the purpose of their parental projects,
if the use of artificial wombs were to be legalized."'
In the U.S., the prospective arrival of ectogenetic technology on the
market makes federal regulation necessary in order to ensure a uniform
application of use. Indeed, risks are attached to the use of such
technology, such as the potential to "manufacture" children, potential
risks for the ectogenetic infants, profound inequity between wealthy and
poor couples,1 72 underline the need for legal safeguards regarding the
access to the artificial wombs beyond the existing regulations of
reproductive technologies.1 7 3 Indeed, artificial wombs will likely raise
deeper concerns than the current use of IVF and surrogacy."l74
VI. CONCLUSION
"[I]t is irresponsible to wait until the first child is born of ectogenesis
before discussing how the law will, or should, treat that new form of
assisted, and collaborative, reproduction." 75 The French and the U.S.
legislatures must ratify new laws, in light of the prospective availability of
artificial wombs, with regards to the status of embryos, the concept of
parenthood, and the access to new reproductive technologies. Ectogenetic
technology is advancing rapidly, but federal legislation is notoriously slow.
French and U.S. legislatures must begin contemplating the most effective
ways to address the above concerns if we are to propose regulations for
such advanced reproductive technology.

171. Another interesting point will be whether the risk to transmit AIDS to the child at the
moment of delivery could legitimize a woman's access to artificial wombs. Also, an
important question to be considered is whether the French social security system should
cover the costs of the use of artificial wombs (including limits and extents of certain factors,
such as the number of attempts that would be covered under the system).
172. See supra Part IV.A.
173. The American Society Reproductive Medicine already acknowledged that it would be
desirable to reinforce the legal arsenal regarding the use of ARTs in addition to their own
practice guidelines. AM. Soc'Y OF REPROD, supra note 54, at I1.
174. Rosen, supra note 27, at 72 ("In the end, artificial wombs are different from current
technologies like IVF and modem arrangements like surrogacy, because they represent the
final severing of reproduction from the human body."). It remains to be discussed under
which legal theory the federal government should be allowed to intervene in this area and to
which extent it can limit the decisions of the medical teams to operate artificial wombs.
175. See generally, MICHELLE HIBBERT, ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (2004).
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